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Abstract: The central coherence involves the processes of perceptual coding and attention 
mechanisms, highly deficient in children with ADHD (Booth & Happé, 2010). According 
to this theory, also children with autism are overly focused on details to the expense of a 
global perspective, and this negatively affects their ability to integrate environmental 
stimuli into a coherent whole (Happé, Booth, Charlton, Hughes, 2006). The aim of this 
study was to determine differences in central coherence of children with high functioning 
autism (ASD; n=10), children with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; n=10) 
and typically developing peers (n=10). Individuals with ADHD exhibit significant deficits 
in perceptual skills and problem solving, failing also in mental states understanding tasks. 
While the children with autism spectrum disorder show impairments in making pragmatic 
inferences. Future research should therefore concentrate on the investigation of the 
cognitive and psychological mechanisms underlying these effects.  
Keywords: Weak central coherence, Autism spectrum disorder, Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, 
Perceptual skill, Pragmatic inference, Mental states understanding. 
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1. INTRODUCTION   
The central procedures of information processing are typically 
characterized by the drive for "coherence", which allows giving a meaning 
to experiences, placing them in a broader context (Frith & Happé, 1994). 
The cognitive flexibility/shifting and response selection/inhibition 
(Mackinlay, Charman, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, Wager, 2000) represent different mechanisms 
likely to be started to support people establish goals and find different 
strategic solutions for attaining individual objectives, adapting answers  to 
events. Although several abilities are not usually engaged during the 
execution of automatic or semi-automatic sequences, they are critical for 
unknown and inexperienced situations that need high levels of attention and 
a flexible use of goal-oriented strategies. The attention is one of the most 
important cognitive processes that allow understanding the stimulus 
meaning within the context (Buckley, 2003; Wilson & Sperber, 1988). 
Specifically, the processes of selective attention permit to isolate the 
important features of stimuli, both perceptual and semantic, that come from 
outside, ignoring those less salient. 
At this regard, it has been argued that the process of central coherence 
assigned to organization of information allows individuals to give 
priority to understanding meaning, and to comprehend the context in which 
events occur. So, in a phrase it is possible to grasp the meaning of the 
message, which is remembered even better if it can be placed in a wider 
context (Vulchanova, Talcott, Vulchanov, & Stankova, 2012). 
But, whereas several studies (Brock, Norbury, Einav, & Nation, 2008) 
have demonstrated that the ability to use context in language comprehension 
is positively related to structural language competence, most recent findings 
(Volden, Coolican, Garon, White, & Bryson, 2009) suggested that the 
impact of structural language measures can justify a significant variance in 
pragmatic skills. 
The pragmatics of communication refers to the ways in which context 
contributes to meaning. Specifically, the meaning of a sentence depends on 
an understanding of the context and the speaker's intent. To pay attention to 
the influence that a given context can have on the message is one of the 
ability more involved in the pragmatic inference process, addressed to the 
understanding of the explicit and implicit meaning of the same sentence 
(Loukusa & Moilanen, 2009). 
In this direction, empirical evidences (Happé, 1999) on semantic 
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coherence (reading for meaning vs reading for sound) and processing 
preference (local or global) in visual-spatial and constructive tasks (e.g. 
Embedded Figures Test and Block Design) have been used to successfully 
explain how some aspects of perceptual organization can be referred to 
more specific research areas, such as semantic studies.  
At this regard, the Weak Central Coherence hypothesis (WCC) (Frith 
& Happé, 1994; Happé & Frith, 2006) offers an explanatory approach for 
enclosing behavioral and cognitive dissociations associated with ASD. 
Specifically, many researchers have defined the distinct cognitive profile in 
children with autism, characterized by a fragmented perceptual–cognitive 
style that enhances ability to detect details in a stimulus and difﬁculties in 
integrating information into a coherent whole (Baron-Cohen & Klin, 2006; 
Landry & Bryson, 2004). This limited ability to understand context or to 
"see the big picture" drives individuals with autism spectrum disorders to 
have a tendency for fragmented perception, and to benefit less from the 
contextual meaning in perceptual or verbal-semantic and global-local 
processing tasks (Dakin & Frith 2005).  
This detailed processing is suggestive of a weak central coherence 
(Frith & Happè, 1994). Thus, the WCC model is based on a cognitive 
abnormality that affects a wide range of psychological functions: 
perception, language and social skills. Individuals with autism spectrum 
disorders tend to process information "piece by piece", rather than in their 
global context, focusing on the development of its component parts. 
Consequently, the information obtained are isolated and fragmented, due to 
a "weak" capacity of central coherence. 
Furthermore, recent studies (Mundy & Jarrold, 2010) have suggested 
that the Weak Central Coherence could also explain social impairments in 
autism spectrum disorders. At this regard, deficits in both responding to 
others’ joint attention directives and initiating joint attention have been 
noted in children with ASD. These impaired joint attention 
behaviors, which require taking into account oneself and the others, are 
evident very early and persist over the years. In addition, a specific delay in 
one of the critical precursors of ToM, and, specifically, the ability to process 
an environmental stimulus within the context in which it occurs, negatively 
affects the typical development of Theory of Mind (Chevallier, Noveck, 
Happé, & Wilson, 2011). Therefore, the two models, Central Coherence and 
ToM, seem to be closely related and have particularly important role in 
helping children to understand the experiences and for improving their 
social development. 
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An interesting conceptualization of the Weak Central Coherence 
model (Mottron & Burack, 2006), rather than focusing  primarily on 
perceptual deficits, suggests a superior attention to detail in the environment 
to the exclusion of overall understanding of context. From this point of 
view, the savant skills in individuals with ASD could be explained by their 
intense focus on little details, their differences in processing and perception, 
and tendencies of obsessive and repetitive behaviors. 
More in depth, in a recent research overview, Happé and Frith (2006) 
have argued that the Weak Central Coherence refers to the detail-focused 
processing style. While the initial explanation was consistent with the 
presence of a core deficit in central processing resulting 
in failure to extract global form and meaning, recently different and more 
interesting interpretations of this cognitive process have been provided. 
First, the cognitive failure could be explained by a possible superiority in 
local or detail-focused processing rather than a central processing deficit 
(Soulieres, Zeffiro, Girard, & Mottron, 2011). Second, the lack of coherence 
might not be necessary a deficit but it could be an atypical processing style. 
In fact, in ASD, the local bias is not the only processing mode available, 
although it might be the default, and a more holistic processing is also 
possible when patients are well instructed (Davis & Plaisted, 2007). Last, 
the Weak Central Coherence may occur simultaneously to deficits in social 
cognition, rather than explains them.  
So, many studies (Frith & Happè, 1994) have sustained the central 
coherence hypothesis as an atypical local processing in ASD, at the expense 
of a weak processing at a more central level. Furthermore, the local 
processing style does not seem to be a simple negative consequence of 
executive dysfunction, but rather it appears to be strongly independent from 
ToM deficits.  
The Weak Central Coherence model suggests, therefore, that the 
cognitive functioning, in individuals with autism spectrum disorders, is 
based on the processing of contextual data and, specifically, of social 
information (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 2001). As consequence, the limited 
ability to reach a central coherence leads people with autism to experience 
the world in a fragmented way, and this processing style could have a 
crucial role in their poor understanding of social stimuli and meaning.   
Moreover, full development of mentalizing abilities ensures a 
cohesive interpretive device of contextual information, and plays a 
significant role in central coherence improvement. Specifically, the ability 
to mentalize puts together complex information from totally disparate 
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sources into a pattern which has meaning. Individuals with ASD can show 
impaired mentalizing capacities due to a specific deficit on integrating 
information at different levels, and this can explain certain ASD symptoms 
and clinical characteristics (Frith & Happè, 1994). 
Nevertheless, it also true that difficulties in shifting from local to 
global could also represent a side-effect of an executive function deficit 
(Harris & Leevers, 2000; Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton, & Tonge, 
2000). In addition, as is well known, executive dysfunction can impair 
communication ability. Specifically, individuals with ASD may find 
difficult to start and maintain a conversation, interpreting utterances in an 
appropriate way, and also the formulation of an appropriate language, 
through intuitive knowledge of others’ mental states and by reading related 
contextual cues, may be weakened in these patients. Therefore, the problem 
solving skills appear closely linked to executive functions, because they 
allow individuals to process information within the context and understand 
the mental states of interaction partners. The most commonly suggested 
explanations for pragmatic inference deficits are theory of mind and central 
coherence (Loukusa & Moilanen, 2009). 
This is also important for children with ADHD. Impulse control 
problems are common in individuals with ADHD and may include difficulty 
to inappropriate response inhibition. Moreover, they tend to overly focus on 
the detail and fail to grasp the whole picture, and the cognitive perseveration 
does not allow them to maintain attention and concentration on task 
(Solomon, Ozonoff, Cummings, & Carter, 2008). In addition, they, which 
usually manifest lack of executive control, may exhibit difficulty on 
processing the stimuli, due to the marked inattention/impulsivity and the 
inability to attribute mental states to others for the incapacity to remain 
"attached" to the context.  
Despite the considerable amount of literature has clearly demonstrated 
severe executive deficits in both disorders, they are characterized by two 
different ways of directing attention to stimuli: overselectivity in children 
with ASD and inattention /impulsivity in children with ADHD. Usually, 
children with autism show inflexible and overselective behaviors, and also 
hyper-reaction to modification of routines characterizes their behavioral 
patterns (Fabio, Oliva, & Murdaca, 2011; Lam, Bodfish, & Piven, 2008).  
Moreover, planning and cognitive flexibility are significantly reduced in 
individuals with ASD (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999), which tend to involve in 
highly perseverative strategies on cognitive flexibility tasks (Hughes, 
Russell, & Robbins, 1994).  Comparing to ASD, subjects with ADHD 
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display more severe deficits of inhibitory control, and the response 
inhibition deficits cause and maintain their impulsive behaviors in everyday 
life (Solomon et al., 2008).  
So, the focus of the present investigation rests on these different 
clinical profiles (ASD vs. ADHD). For the first time, we explore the 
possible impact of these two different attentive models on the ability to 
direct selective attention to relevant contextual stimuli and to analyze them 
according to the context intent. 
While there is widespread agreement on a general description of 
executive functions, controversial data are been recorded comparing Weak 
Central Coherence and ToM performances of different clinical populations 
that show an impairment in these specific cognitive abilities. This aspect 
needs to be more examined, verifying whether the two different cognitive 
constructs are related or they follow different developmental trajectories. In 
addition, most of the studies on WCC have focused attention on the 
perceptual aspects. According to this framework, the Central Coherence 
refers to the ability to collect stimuli from the context into a coherent whole, 
reserving a secondary role to the ability to grasp the meaning of the actions 
taking place in the context.  
Starting from these theoretical premises, in the present research we 
explored ASD and ADHD children's ability to process contextual 
information through perceptual organization and semantic inference tasks. 
While in previous research (Booth & Happè, 2010) exclusively perceptual 
tasks have been used to measure central coherence in autistic samples, in 
this study perceptual and semantic tasks have been introduced for evaluating 
the central coherence level, considering both capacities as essential to the 
overall organization of the context and for understanding contextual 
information meaning. A second, perhaps even more important, novel aspect 
of the present investigation is to analyze the ability to use the context for 
story completion task that implies the attribution of mental states to the 
protagonist of the story. More in depth, the aim of this study was to 
investigate the nature of central coherence in children with high functioning 
autism, children with ADHD and typically developing peers, in order to 
verify which of the two different impairments, overselectivity or 
impulsivity, may have a greater impact on the ability to organize and 
process information. 
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2. METHOD  
2.1 Participants  
Thirty individuals participated in the study, 10 diagnosed with autistic 
spectrum disorder, 10 affected by ADHD, and 10 typically developing 
controls. The first group included 10 high functioning children with autism 
ranging from 6 to 12 years (M = 8.25; SD = 2.44). They will hereby be 
referred to as the group of children with autistic spectrum disorders (ASD). 
Children with ASD were diagnosed according to the DSM-IV-TR 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for autism. IQ scores were 
measured with the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991 – Italian version) (see Table 
1). In addition, symptom profile of the participants in the ASD group was 
measured using the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (Schopler, Reichler, 
DeVellis, & Daly, 1980). 
Total scores range from 15 to 60. A score of 30 represents the cutoff 
for a diagnosis of autism on the mild end of the autism spectrum. In the 
present study a mean of 35.46 emerged (SD=1.74) which corresponds to 
mild to moderate levels of autism. 
The Attention-Deﬁcit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) group 
comprised 10 children, aged from 6 to 13 years (M= 8.34; SD= 1.62), with a 
formal diagnosis of ADHD based on DSM-IV-TR criteria and a normally 
ranged Full Scale IQ score (see Table 1). ADHD participants were included 
immediately after their first clinical diagnosis and had thus not received any 
pharmacological or psychoeducational therapy before.  
The typically developing (TD) comparison group comprised 10 IQ 
matched neurotypical children (see Table 1), recruited from two different 
schools. They were engaged via local primary schools and they all attended 
normal classes corresponding to their age level schools and were free of 
psychiatric disorders at the time of testing. They were chosen on the basis of 
their age and IQ scores. 
Experimental children were recruited from two different rehabilitation 
centres operating in the area of the city of Messina. Only participants 
without comorbidity of behavioural disorders, learning impairments, and 
mental retardation were included. Potential autistic subjects were excluded 
if found to have an associated neurological, genetic, infectious, or metabolic 
disorder such as fragile X syndrome, encephalitis, or other known medical 
conditions associated. 
There were no significant differences between the autism, ADHD, and 
control groups with respect to age, educational level, and IQ levels. All 
8 FILIPPELLO P., MARINO F. ET AL. 
participants were native Italian speakers. Each child was individually tested 
and informed about the procedure of the experiment. Parental informed 
consent was obtained for all subjects and the experimental procedure was 
approved by the local ethics committee. 
 
2.2 Measures and procedure 
 
2.2.1 Perceptual skill task 
For assessment of perceptual abilities, Raven’s Colored Progressive 
Matrices (Raven, 1998) and Objects Assembly subtest of WISC III R 
(Wechsler, 2006) were used. In this study, it was administered only a part of 
the CPM (Series: A1-A4-A8-A12- Ab1- Ab4- Ab8- Ab12- B1 -B4- B8- 
B12), progressing to increased levels of complexity. That is because 
children with ASD and ADHD might have more trouble with tasks that 
require a high attention level, so as to invalidate the results. For the Objects 
Assembly subtest of WISC III R, the child must analyze the picture (an 
apple, a car, a girl and a child face) and construct the whole visual object 
from its parts within time constraints.  
Two specially created tools namely, Pragmatic Inference Test 
(Filippello & Marino, unpublished results) and Mental-states Test (children 
version) (Filippello & Marino, unpublished results) were constructed to 
assess semantic competences.  
 
2.2.2 Pragmatic inference task 
The Pragmatic Inference Test measures the semantic aspect of 
cognitive coherence. It was specially structured to evaluate the ability to 
connect two events, using the context to infer the missing information. The 
test has been previously validated by administering to a sample of 200 
typically developing children ranging in age from 4 to 5 years (M=4.5, 
SD=.70) and its coefficient alpha was good (α= .79), demonstrating 
very good psychometric properties. The pragmatic inference task consists of 
a short description of pragmatic inference and 8 short everyday stories in 
which there are described a started event and a subsequent situation cause-
related to the event previously mentioned. Each time, after reading one of 
the eight short stories, participants were instructed to respond to about each 
story. They were asked to tell to the researcher the cause explicitly and 
logically linked to the event mentioned in the started situation [e.g.: 
Someone gives a candy to Louis - The enclosure of the candy is dropped. (a) 
Louis threw the enclosure on the floor. (b) Louis ate the candy (??)]. Verbal 
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responses were recorded on paper and the accuracy of each response was 
rated on a 1–3 scale by a researcher: 1 for a not given answer, 2 for an 
incorrect answer, and 3 for a fully correct answer. A maximum score of 24 
was therefore possible. Higher scores indicate more pragmatic inference 
abilities.  
2.2.3 Mental-states understanding task 
The Mental-states Test (children version) evaluates the children 
understanding of psychological states in certain contexts and the ability to 
complete the description of story fragments using the context. Although 
there are good tools designed to assess the ToM ability (Blijd-Hoogewys, 
van Geert, Serra, & Minderaa, 2008), none of these is structured in such a 
way as to ensure that the responses of the child to be guided by the context. 
Even this test has been previously validated by administering to a sample of 
200 children with typical development ranging in age from 4 to 5 years 
(M=4.5, SD=.70). The results showed that the instrument has excellent 
psychometric properties of validity and reliability in measuring the 
understanding of psychological states corresponding to specific context [α 
=.84].  It is a task (purely semantic) consists of a single story, composed of 
40 chronologically connected events, in which the protagonist (a boy named 
Marco) carries out several everyday activities. Although the story unfolds as 
the day progressed (morning, time at school, afternoon and evening), in this 
study it is preferred to use a shortened version of the test (22 slides rather 
than 44), so only morning and school time were selected for the assessment. 
Each piece of story is represented by a picture that describes the initial state 
of the protagonist and two other drawings depicting the two possible 
response options. It was possible to choose between two different response 
options: one was consistent with both the protagonist’s mental state and the 
context (correct choice), the other one was reliable with the mental state but 
not with the context (incorrect choice) (see Figure 1). The sequence (correct 
or incorrect) of responses presented was randomized. It was preferred to 
restrict the choice of two possible responses in order to analyze the children 
ability to use the context for successfully completing each piece of history. 
For describing the events, it was used terms relating to five mental states. 
The five types of mental states considered were: the epistemic state (e.g., he 
opens your eyes and thinks, imagines, remembers, pretends, etc); the 
decisional state (e.g., he decides), the emotional one  (e.g., he is happy, 
angry, sad, fear, etc.); the physical state (e.g., he snorts, claps his hands, 
pouts, jumps on the bed, etc.) and the motivational state (e.g., he expects, 
wants, hopes, wishes, demands etc.). The accuracy of each response was 
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rated on a 1–2 scale: 1 for an incorrect answer, 2 for correct answer. A total 
maximum score of 44 was therefore possible. Higher scores indicate more 
understanding of psychological states abilities. 
 
Figure 1 
Example of mental-states understanding task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Study data were analyzed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences) 17.0 for Windows.  
A 3 (group: ASD, ADHD and control group) X 4 (type of task: 
CPM/12, Object Assembly test, Mental States understanding Test, 
Pragmatic Inference Test) between-subjects design was used. 
The signiﬁcance of differences in all dependent variables between 
groups was also determined using independent t-tests. Therefore, Pearson 
correlations were run to examine the relationship among the variables 
involved in the analyses. A .05 significance level was allocated in all tests. 
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Raw data, as it was relative frequencies, has been transformed into sin-1 
(Freeman & Tukey, 1950). 
Table 1 reports means and standard deviations of Colored Progressive 
Matrices, Object Assembly subtest, Mental States and Pragmatic Inference 
scores, obtained by three groups. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for developmental and study variables. 
 Autism   ADHD  Typical 
 M   SD  M  SD  M  SD 
Developmental 
level 
           
Chronological age 8.25  2.44  8.34  1.62  8.33  1.91 
Full Scale IQ 87.03  7.57  87.52  10.79  89.03  5.92 
 
CPM 1.05  .30  .68  .22  1.20  .15 
Object Assembly 1.07  .34  .52  .30  1.20  .10 
Pragmatic Inference 
making  
.87  .42  .94  .17  1.47  .11 
Mental states 
understanding 
1.37  .25  1.11  .35  1.57  .00 
 
 
The factor ‘‘groups’’ shows significant effects (F2,27=12.009, p <.001). 
Typically developing children reach higher levels of performance in all 
presented tasks compared to their peers in atypical development.  
Specifically, while the ADHD group performing overall more poorly than 
both other groups, the ASD group generally failed the Pragmatic inference 
test. 
The factor ‘‘type of tasks”   has significant effects (F3,81=17.44, p 
<.001). This means that there are differences among the understanding and 
learning of the different cognitive tasks. 
Lastly, a significant ‘‘groups x type of tasks” interaction was found   
(F6,81=8.07, p < .05), indicating that children with autism and ADHD group 
had notable difficulties selecting correct answers; in fact, they were 
substantially worse than the control subjects on recognizing the right 
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contents. Data suggest that, regarding these types of tasks, children affected 
by autism and ADHD have, in a different way, more difficulties to achieve 
high performances. 
For a more detailed statistical analysis, comparisons between two 
groups were made using Student’s t-tests. Results indicated that there are 
statistically significant differences in pragmatic inference task between ASD 
and normally developing children (t= -4.29, p <.001): children with autism 
have been found to not use this cognitive ability more frequently than 
control children. While ADHD group showed more difficult than controls in 
providing correct answers to the Colored Progressive Matrices Test (t= -
5.77, p <.001), in understanding of mental states (t= -4.003, p <.05), and in 
pragmatic inference task (t=-7.95, p <.001). Therefore, performances on the 
Object Assembly subtest significantly differed between ADHD children and 
control group (t=-6.62, p <.001) and comparing the two clinical groups 
(ADHD vs, ASD group) (t = -3.76, p <.05), with the ADHD children 
performing more poorly than other group.  
Finally, signiﬁcant positive correlations between the all dependent 
variables were found. Table 2 reports Pearson's correlation coefficient of 
examined factors.  
 
Table 2 
Correlations between all dependent variables.  
 CPM Object Assembly 
Pragmatic inference making .398 (*) .526(**) 
Mental states understanding .671(**) .567(**) 
**  p < .01 level; *  p < .05 level   
 
Correlational analysis supported the idea of a strong linking among 
different cognitive abilities. Specifically, the results suggest that with the 
increasing of intellectual abilities also the discriminative and inferential 
skills improve, and the adequate understanding and attribution processes of 
psychological states to specific contexts appear more efficient. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the assessment measures used in this 
study underpin single central coherence ability in integrating environmental 
stimuli, both visual and semantic, into a coherent whole. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present study was aimed to investigate significant differences in 
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central coherence between children with high functioning autism, children 
with ADHD and typically developing peers. The comparisons between 
participants occurred on central coherence tasks and on ToM tasks, or the 
ability to give meaning and coherence to fragmented elements and attribute 
psychological states according to context analysis.  
Results revealed significant differences in the scores obtained by the 
three groups (ASD, ADHD and TD). Generally, individuals with ASD and 
ADHD exhibited significantly worse performance in all four tests compared 
to their typical developed peers. However, comparing the two clinical 
groups, perceptual skills and the ability to understand and allocate the 
different psychological states in specific contexts appear to be more 
compromised in children with ADHD. Specifically, the impulsivity of 
children with ADHD can cause problems with control and response 
inhibition, impairing acquisition and development of certain cognitive 
abilities. Increasing latency between the presentation of the stimulus and the 
child's response might, however, facilitate a more quick learning process 
and support children with an attention deficit.  
Regarding individuals with ASD, they massively failed the pragmatic 
inference tasks. This finding confirms that basic visual and linguistic 
perceptual functions may be affected in individuals with ASD, and also their 
ability to integrate fragmented stimuli into a coherent whole it has been 
demonstrated to be significantly impaired. 
As already noted, in fact, the unusual perceptual and cognitive style of 
individuals with autism is characterized by an inability to integrate 
information in relevant context, a segmented processing experience, an 
inability to experience wholes, and a persistent preoccupation with parts of 
objects’. 
Based on these perceptual and cognitive deficits, a “weak central 
coherence” in children with ASD was confirmed in this study. Specifically, 
in both perceptual and semantic tasks, the group with ASD scored 
significantly lower than the control group, due to the fact that these patients 
are not able to integrate experience elements in a coherent scene, and hence 
unable to well completed administered tasks.  To meet the complex needs of 
people with autism, it could be useful design specific interventions for 
coping central coherence deficits. A cognitive-rehabilitative treatment, 
conducted by a professional multidisciplinary team, could achieve results in 
both the acquisition of more complex learning skills and the social 
competences of children. Specifically, the implementation of special autism 
cognitive treatment, based on a central coherence intensive and early 
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intervention, can also enhance motivation for social interaction and 
prompting speciﬁc social behavior usually impaired in these patients.   
This study expands upon research on the role of Weak Central 
Coherence and ToM performances of different clinical populations in 
several ways. Although research has been abundant on the impact of 
specific cognitive impairments, these aspects need to be more examined, 
verifying whether the two different cognitive constructs are related or they 
follow different developmental trajectories. Past research on WCC have 
focused attention on the perceptual aspects of Central Coherence 
hypothesis, or rather on the role of the ability to collect stimuli from the 
context into a coherent whole. This study expanded upon this perspective by 
measuring the ability to grasp the meaning of the actions taking place in the 
context, including additional forms of central coherence assessment. Up 
until this time, no study has examined ability to process contextual 
information through perceptual organization and semantic inference tasks in 
ASD and ADHD children.  Although the intention of many studies is to 
understand WCC effects on children psychological and social functioning, 
exclusively perceptual tasks have been used to measure this construct in 
clinical samples, with the result that it is often unmeasured or inadequately 
measured. In the current study, perceptual and semantic tasks have been 
introduced for evaluating the central coherence level, considering both 
capacities as essential to the overall organization of the context and for 
understanding contextual information meaning.  
Another important contribution of this study is the comparison of 
clinical groups (ASD vs ADHD) that show two different attentive 
impairments, overselectivity and  impulsivity. These specific cognitive 
functioning can impact in a different way on the ability to organize and 
process information. In addition, this study expanded upon these cognitive 
mechanisms by measuring the ability to use the context for story completion 
task that implies the attribution of mental states to the protagonist of the 
story.  
Despite all this study presents some considerable limitations. First, the 
sample size is small. This is due to the rigidity of the inclusion criteria 
related to determining characteristics disorders taken into consideration. 
Second, the current study was cross-sectional in design and its results 
should be interpreted as such. A longitudinal study that tracks cognitive 
children development over time would supplement this research by showing 
how changes in central coherence and ToM relate to social functioning over 
time and how attentive impairments differently affect the overall cognitive 
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development in the life span. Moreover, the groups were too heterogeneous, 
because it was not possible to control gender variable. Future studies, testing 
potential moderating variables, such as gender, socioeconomic status and 
rehabilitation program, may help provide valuable information for designing 
interventions for certain groups of children. Future work, therefore, may be 
necessary to enlarge the sample and have a better chance of generalization. 
It may also be interesting to see whether training aimed at the modification 
of dysfunctional attentive styles, can produce effects on the ability to use the 
context to process environmental stimuli. 
Nevertheless, this research can be considered a first step towards the 
knowledge and study of the central coherence mechanisms and processes 
involved. It can be a starting point for the formulation of specific treatments 
aimed to the development of this important capacity that regulates the 
perceptual and semantic mechanisms. The purpose of these training should 
be to promote and improve the cognitive, behavioral and social functioning 
of these specific impaired patients.  Specifically, the inability to have a 
global vision of the stimuli, certainly inhibits many learning behaviors not 
only for the subjects with autistic disorder but also for children with 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. 
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